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WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 1, 1792.

Whitehall, February 1.

THE following Letters from Earl Cornwallis were Yesterday received by the Swallow Packet.

Camp near Bangalore, Sept. 8, 1791.

MY LORD,

I Have by this Opportunity addreſſed Letters to the Honorable Court of Directors of the Eaſt India Company, and to the Secret Committee, containing a general Account of the Operations of the Forces under my Command, ſince the Month of April laſt; of the reduced State of Tippoo Sultaun's Power and Reſources; and of the Plan which has been concerted with our Allies for a vigorous Proſecution of the War, until that Prince ſhall be diſpoſed to make ſatisfactory Conceſſions to the Members of the Confederacy for the Inſults and Injuries they have ſuſtained from him.

It is unneceſſary to trouble you with a Repetition of the Contents of thoſe Letters, as Copies of them will be tranſmitted to you officially from the India-Houſe; and your Lordſhip will, by that Means, be enabled to communicate full Information to His Majeſty of the Situation of Public Affairs in this Country.

The Duties of all the Troops upon this Service have been ſingularly ſevere and arduous; and I requeſt that you will inform the King, that the Patience under Fatigue and Difficulties of various Kinds, and the Intrepidity in Danger, which has been uniformly manifeſted by the Officers and Soldiers of His Majeſty's Regiments, in common with the reſt of the Army, has not only merited my warmeſt Approbation, but will ever do Honor to themſelves and to their Country; and the Zeal and Ability with which I have been ſeconded by Generals Medows and Abercromby, in their reſpective Situations, has been no leſs gratifying to myſelf perſonally, than uſeful in promoting the Public Intereſts.

Incloſed is a Return of the Loſs of His Majeſty's Troops in Killed and Wounded during the laſt Campaign.

I have the Honor to be,

My Lord,

Your moſt obedient and moſt humble Servant,

CORNWALLIS.

Right Honorable Lord Grenville, One of His Majeſty's Principal Secretaries of State, &c. &c. &c.

Return of the Killed and Wounded of His Majeſty's Troops during the Siege of Bangalore, from the 5th to the 22d of March, and at the Battle of Seringapatam, on the 15th of May, 1791.

Siege of Bangalore, from the 5th to the 22d of March, 1791.

19*th Light Dragoons.* 1 Lieutenant-Colonel wounded; 1 Drummer, 2 Rank and File, killed; 7 Rank and File miſſing.

36*th Regiment of Foot.* 1 Captain, 9 Rank and File, killed; 1 Captain, 3 Lieutenants, 1 Serjeant, 1 Drummer, 39 Rank and File, wounded.

52*d Ditto.* 1 Captain, 4 Rank and File, killed; 1 Lieutenant, 1 Drummer, 2 Rank and File, wounded.

71*ſt Ditto.* 6 Rank and File killed; 1 Serjeant, 1 Drummer, 12 Rank and File, wounded.

72*d Ditto.* 6 Rank and File killed; 1 Serjeant, 23 Rank and File, wounded.

74*th Ditto.* 1 Rank and File killed; 1 Captain, 1 Lieutenant, 7 Rank and File, wounded.

76*th Ditto.* 6 Rank and File killed; 1 Captain, 2 Serjeants, 2 Drummers, 41 Rank and File, wounded.

Battle of Seringapatam, May 15, 1791.

19*th Dragoons.* 1 Enſign, 2 Rank and File, killed; 2 Enſigns, 6 Rank and File, wounded.

36*th Foot.* 2 Rank and File killed; 1 Lieutenant, 6 Rank and File, wounded.

52*d Ditto.* 1 Lieutenant, 2 Rank and File, killed; 20 Rank and File wounded.

[Price Eight-pence.]

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71*ſt Ditto.* 1 Lieutenant, 1 Serjeant, 7 Rank and File, killed; 21 Rank and File wounded.
72*d Ditto.* 1 Lieutenant, 9 Rank and File, wounded.
74*th Ditto.* 5 Rank and File killed; 1 Drummer, 8 Rank and File, wounded.
76*th Ditto.* 1 Lieutenant, 2 Rank and File, killed; 1 Lieutenant, 1 Serjeant, 17 Rank and File, wounded.
Total. 2 Captains, 3 Lieutenants, 1 Enſign, 1 Serjeant, 1 Drummer, 54 Rank and File, killed; 1 Lieutenant-Colonel, 3 Captains, 8 Lieutenants, 3 Enſigns, 6 Serjeants, 6 Drummers, 211 Rank and File, wounded; 7 Rank and File miſſing.

Names of Officers killed and wounded.

Lieutenant-Colonel Floyd wounded March 6, 1791.
Captain Delany killed. Captain Hart, Lieutenants Eyre, Purefoy and St. John wounded, March 7.
Captain Terrott killed, March 16; Lieutenant Evans wounded, March 21.
Captain Wood and Lieutenant John Campbell, jun. wounded, March 21.
Captain Markham wounded, March 21; Volunteer Llewellin ditto, included in the Rank and File, March 21.
Cornet Patterſon killed, Cornets Fortnam and Mackenzie wounded.
Lieutenant Firman wounded.
Lieutenant and Adjutant Leonard killed.
Lieutenant and Adjutant M'Kenzie killed; Enſign John Stuart wounded.
Lieutenant Waitlie wounded.
Lieutenant Brooke killed, and Lieutenant Griffiths wounded.

N. B. The Siege of Bangalore includes the following Actions:

March 5. Tippoo's Attack in the Rear of the Army, on approaching Bangalore.

March 6. Colonel Floyd's Skirmiſh with the Rear of Tippoo's Army.

March 7. Storm of the Pettah or Suburbs of Bangalore: Tippoo's Attack on our Camp, and Attempt to recover the Pettah.

March 17. Tippoo's Attack on our Camp; and, on the 21ſt, his Attempt to counteract our Approaches, and enfilade our Batteries. Aſſault of the Fort that Night.

To the Honorable Court of Directors for the Affairs of the Honorable the United Company of Merchants of England trading to the Eaſt Indies.

Honorable Sirs,

I Had the Honor, in my Letter dated at Venkatigherry on the 20th of April laſt, to give your Honorable Court an Account of the principal Operations of the Army under my Command prior to that Period, and to communicate my Intention to attack Seringapatam, if it ſhould be found practicable, with a View to leave no Means untried to bring this War to a ſpeedy Termination; and although the Multiplicity of Objects which perpetually break in upon my Time, and preſs for immediate Attention in my preſent Situation, will not permit me to enter into many Details, I ſhall now proceed to explain to you the Manner in which the premature Setting-in of the Monſoon Rains, the Difficulty of paſſing the Caveri River, and the Inactivity of the Nizam's Cavalry, operated as irreſiſtible Reaſons to force me to deſiſt, at that Time, from undertaking the Siege of the Enemy's Capital, and to acquaint you with the Occurrences that have materially contributed to reduce Tippoo's Strength and Reſources, and to give a very favorable Proſpect of Succeſs to the Plan of Operations, which has been adopted by all the Members of the Confederacy, for the enſuing Campaign.

Previous to the Commencement of my March to Seringapatam, Tippoo, in Addition to the Mortification which he ſuffered from the Loſs of Bangalore, had alſo felt the Conſequences of that Blow at a great Diſtance, and our Allies had, from it's Effects, gained very deciſive Advantages.

The ſtrong Fortreſſes of Durwar and Copaul had long been inveſted and beſieged by the Mahrattas and the Nizam, and with ſo little Proſpect of Succeſs, that it had been more than once under the Conſideration of the Courts of Poona and Hydrabad whether they ſhould not convert thoſe Sieges into Blockades, to ſet their Armies at Liberty for more active Operations; but the News of the Fall of Bangalore, which ſeemed to have been unexpected by the Garriſons of thoſe Places, ſo effectually intimidated them, that although in no Shape reduced to Extremity, or even Diſtreſs, they agreed to ſurrender.

Large Magazines of Military Stores, which had been amaſſed in thoſe Places, at a vaſt Expence, by Tippoo, fell into the Hands of the Captors; and during the Time that I was employed in forming a Junction with the Nizam's Cavalry, and in drawing Supplies and Reinforcements from the Carnatic, they alſo obtained complete Poſſeſſion of the whole of the Enemy's extenſive and valuable Territories lying between the Khriſtna and Tumbuddra.

Nothing of Conſequence occurred on the March from Venkatagherry to Bangalore, and after having taken out of that Place heavy Guns and Supplies of Military Stores and Proviſions, to the utmoſt Extent that could be tranſported by the general zealous Aſſiſtance that I received from the Officers of the Army, and by all the Draft and Carriage Cattle in the Poſſeſſion of the Public; and afrer having received Information that General Abercromby, with a Battering Train, which, in Addition to my own, I was in Hopes would be ſufficient for the Accompliſhment of our Object, was at the Head of the Pondicherrum Ghaut, and in Readineſs to co-operate with me, I moved on the 3d of May from the Neighbourhood of Bangalore, with a reſpectable and ſufficient Corps of Artillery, the Nizam's Horſe, His Majeſty's 19th Regiment of Dragoons, Five Regiments of Native Cavalry, Six King's Regiments, and One of the Company's European Regiments, and Seventeen Battalions of Native Infantry.

Tippoo, after calling in all his Detachments, had, about that Time, encamped near Magri, and ſoon after, receiving Information of my Movement, he marched, by one of the moſt direct Roads, to his Capital, where he arrived on the 8th or 9th of May.

I knew that he had long before given Orders to burn the Villages, and to deſtroy the Proviſions and Forage on all the Roads by which we could march to Seringapatam, and therefore no Road was, in theſe Reſpects, preferable to another; but, after the moſt mature Conſideration, I determined to take the moſt Eaſterly Route, which paſſes through Cankanelly, though it is not the ſhorteſt, becauſe it would lead us near the Banks of the Caveri for many Miles before we ſhould reach Seringapatam; and as there is no Place of Strength near the Capital on the North Side of the River, in which I could lodge the heavy Artillery and Stores in Security for a few Days, with a moderate Garriſon, I was in Hopes that I might be able to croſs that River with the whole of the Army, and to effect a Junction with General Abercromby, be-

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fore I ſhould find it neceſſary to approach near to the ultimate Object of the Movement.

It ſoon appeared that only a ſmall Number of the Enemy's irregular Horſe had been appointed to attend to that Road; but by an extraordinary Activity on their Part, and a moſt unaccountable Supineneſs and Want of Exertion on the Part of the Nizam's Cavalry, which neither my Requiſitions nor Orders could overcome, we ſuffered ſome Loſs, both in Baggage and Followers, on the March; and not only the Villages were laid in Aſhes, but all the Inhabitants of the Country, on the whole of the Road to Seringapatam, were alſo, with the moſt unrelenting Barbarity, carried off, and more completely removed beyond our Reach than could have been ſuppoſed to be practicable. Thoſe ſevere Meaſures of the Enemy, and the Inactivity of the Nizam's Cavalry, who could not be prevailed upon to forage at a Diſtance, frequently occaſioned a Scarcity in the Camp, both of Forage for the Cattle and Proviſions for the Followers; and in a Country, of which no minute or correct Deſcription has hitherto been publiſhed, or, 'till now, obtained by any European, I experienced the greateſt Inconveniencies, in many Shapes, by the Removal of the Inhabitants.

The Caveri is never, I believe, lower than it was during the greateſt Part of laſt May; and as none of the People, who pretended to be acquainted with it's Courſe, and who were repeatedly examined upon that Point, had ever ſtarted a Doubt of it's being paſſable for an Army, with heavy Artillery, below Seringapatam, I was not a little ſurprized and diſappointed at finding, from my own perſonal Inſpection, or from the Reports of intelligent Officers, who were ſent with Detachments in Search of Fords at different Places, that, from it's Bed being rocky, and difficult beyond what I have ever ſeen for ſo great a Tract in any other River, it appeared nearly, if not utterly, impracticable to paſs our heavieſt Guns over at any Ford that could be diſcovered below Seringapatam.

After ſeveral Diſappointments at other Places, I was, for a ſhort Time, encouraged to hope that a Ford might, by conſiderable Labour, be rendered practicable near the large Village of Arrakerry, which lay upon our Road, and about Nine or Ten Miles diſtant from the Capital; and if it could have been accompliſhed, my Intention was to have poſſeſſed myſelf of the new Fort of Myſore, which is only diſtant about Twelve or Fourteen Miles from that Part of the River, and was deſcribed to me to be in ſo unfiniſhed a State as to be incapable of making a conſiderable Reſiſtance againſt our Army, though ſufficiently advanced to be eaſily rendered, with a Garriſon of our's, a ſafe Depôt, for a few Days, for our Stores and heavy Artillery, and to make Two or Three Marches with the Army, lightly equipped, towards Periapatam, in order to put myſelf between Tippoo and General Abercromby, and by that Means render our Junction eaſy and ſecure.

The Army arrived at Arrakerry on the 13th, and a particular Examination of that Ford, as well as of the River for a conſiderable Diſtance above and below it, obliged me, early in the Forenoon of the 14th, to relinquiſh all Idea of being able to execute that Plan; and, after minutely re-examining every Perſon in the Army who was acquainted with the River, my Expectations of being able to form an early Junction with General Abercromby reſted ſolely on Aſſurances, that the Ford near the Village of Kannambady, about Eight or Nine Miles above Seringapatam, over which it was poſitively aſſerted that Hyder Ally had frequently paſſed Twelve-Pounders, and ſometimes heavier Guns, would be found practicable.

In the mean Time, however, I conceived that Tippoo had furniſhed an Opening which would enable me to force him to riſk an Action, and I reſolved not to let ſlip ſo favorable an Opportunity to endeavour to obtain the Reputation to our Arms, which muſt neceſſarily reſult from a Victory in the Sight of his Capital, and, in the Event of my being able to cut off the greateſt Part of his Army, to be prepared to follow up the Advantage to the greateſt Extent that might be poſſible.

Upon my Arrival on the Ground, which was marked for the Encampment at Arrakerry, I ſaw a conſiderable Body of the Enemy, at the Diſtance of about Six Miles, in our Front, who were drawn up with their Right to the River, and their Left to a Mountain of a very rugged and inacceſſible Appearance; but I conſidered them in no other Light, at that Time, than as a large Detachment, ſent to obſerve our Motions, without any Deſign to wait for our Approach.

My Intention to paſs the River at that Place, if the Ford could be rendered practicable, and the Hopes that were at firſt held out of the Succeſs of our working Parties, occaſioned my halting on the 14th in the Camp at Arrakerry; and I then obtained certain Intelligence, that although only a ſmall Part of the Enemy's Force could be ſeen from the Ground in our Poſſeſſion, yet that Tippoo, with his whole Army, had encamped between us and Seringapatam, his Right covered by the Caveri, and his Left extended along the Front of a high Mountain, with a deep ſwampy Ravine, the Paſſage of which was defended by Batteries running along the whole of his Front; and that being encouraged by the Advantages of this Poſition, as well as thoſe of the intermediate Ground, which, by the River on one Side and a ſteep Ridge of Hills on the other, was narrowed to a Space no where between the Two Encampments exceeding a Mile and a Half, and within Cannon Shot of his Line not above One Mile in Breadth, he had determined, at the Hazard of the Event of a Battle, to endeavour to prevent our nearer Approach to his Capital.

In conſequence of this Information, and from my having aſcertained, from the few People in Camp who had any Knowledge of the adjoining Country, as well as from the Obſervations of intelligent Perſons who were employed for the Purpoſe, that it was practicable, though difficult, to croſs the Ridge on our Right, from the great Road on which we were encamped to a Road which leads from Cenepatam to Seringapatam, I reſolved, upon that Knowledge, to attempt, by a Night March, to turn the Enemy's Left Flank, and, by gaining his Rear before Day-Light, to cut off the Retreat of the Main Body of his Army to the Iſland and Fort of Seringapatam.

Orders were accordingly given, with the utmoſt Secreſy, to the principal Officers who were to be employed, that the 19th Dragoons, the Three ſtrongeſt of the Native Regiments of Cavalry, His Majeſty's Six Regiments, and Twelve Battalions of Native Infantry, with Field Pieces only, ſhould be in Readineſs to march at Eleven o'Clock at Night, leaving their Piquets and Camp Guards behind, and their Tents ſtanding; and Colonel Duff, with thoſe Detachments and the Remainder of the Army (except the Nizam's Horſe, who were directed to follow me at Day-Light) was left in Charge of the Encampment, Proviſions, Stores, and heavy Artillery.

We had ſuffered greatly, during the preceding Week, by Rains uncommonly frequent and heavy ſo early

early in the Seaſon: But unluckily, on that particular Night, we had for ſeveral Hours the moſt violent Thunder, Lightning and Rain that I have ſeen in this Part of India.

The Ground of our Encampment having been interſected by ſome ruined Villages and Incloſures, and ſeveral deep Ravines, much valuable Time was loſt before it was poſſible to form the Troops in the Order of March which was directed; and, owing to the heavy Rain and exceſſive Darkneſs of the Night, I was obliged to halt ſo frequently after I had begun to move forward, either on Account of many of the Regiments loſing at different Times the Line of March, or of the Weakneſs of the Gun Bullocks, which were jaded and exhauſted by the Severity of the Storm, that I had only advanced a few Miles when the Day began to dawn.

All Hopes were then at an End of being able to execute my original Plan; but having accompliſhed the Part of the March that had been deſcribed to me as the moſt difficult, and having the utmoſt Confidence in the Valour and Diſcipline of the King's and Company's Troops, I determined to perſevere in endeavouring to force Tippoo to hazard an Action on Ground which I hoped would be leſs advantageous to him than that which he had choſen, with the Expectation that a complete Victory might not only relieve many of our temporary Diſtreſſes, but tend to bring the War to a very ſpeedy Concluſion.

The Army, therefore, continued it's March; and the Movement had been ſo entirely unexpected by the Enemy, that we had begun to deſcend the Heights on the Eaſtward of the deep Ravine that I have mentioned, and at the Diſtance of Four or Five Miles from the Left of their Camp, before they took the Alarm.

After ſome Movements, the Object of which could not for a ſhort Time be clearly aſcertained, it appeared that Tippoo, notwithſtanding that we were advancing by a Route for which he was not prepared, did not decline to riſk the Event of a Battle in a new Poſition: He detached immediately from his Main Body a large Corps of Infantry and Cavalry, with Eight Guns, to occupy the Summit of a riſing Ground, about Two Miles from the Extremity of his Left, which terminates to the Northward in an abrupt Precipice in the middle of a Plain; and though the Aſcent is broken by large Rocks, and ſome intermediate leſſer Heights, riſes gradually for about a Mile and a Half, or Two Miles, from a Valley that was in our Front, and which continued to the Caveri, and divided the Ridge of Hills that we had croſſed during the Night from another ſteep Ridge, conſiſting principally of Two large Mountains (on a projecting Point of the Southernmoſt of which ſtands the Carigut Pagoda) running nearly at right Angles to the former, at the Diſtance of about a Mile and a Half, and extending very near to the Caveri, oppoſite the Iſland of Seringapatam.

Whilſt the Corps was on its March, to poſſeſs itſelf of the Summit that I have mentioned, Tippoo was employed in changing the Front of his Army to the Left, covering his Left Flank with the ſteep Hill, which had been in his Rear, and his Right Flank with the Ravine, which ran along his former Front.

The Diſpoſition on our Side for Action could only be made on the Aſcent of the Heights, to the Summit of which the Enemy's Detachment was then moving, and from which it was abſolutely neceſſary to diſlodge it before I could attack their Main Body.

Our March was therefore continued in that Direction acroſs the Valley through which ran a Continuation of the Ravine which covered the Enemy's Right; but, owing to the Depth of that Ravine, the weak State of the Gun Bullocks, and the near Approach of a large Body of the Enemy's Horſe, that, though repulſed in ſeveral Attempts, appeared to be prepared to take Advantage of the leaſt Diſorder in any of our Battalions, it was upwards of Two Hours after the Paſſage of the Head of the Column before the whole Infantry could croſs to the ſame Side of the Ravine with the Enemy, and conſequently before the Diſpoſition for Action could be completed; and during that Time we ſuffered ſome Loſs from the Guns on the Height, oppoſite to the Head of the Column, but were ſeverely galled by a well-directed though diſtant Fire from the Artillery of the Enemy's Main Body, which had formed nearly parallel to he Direction of our March. t

Under theſe Difficulties, and under the Diſadvantage of the Want of all ſatisfactory local Information beyond what could be ſeen, of the intended Field of Battle, and of the adjoining Country, Nine Battalions were formed oppoſite to the Enemy's Main Body, in a firſt Line, under the Command of Major-General Medows and Lieutenant-Colonel Stuart; Four Battalions in a Second Line, under Lieutenant-Colonel Harris, and Five under Lieutenant-Colonel Maxwell, were deſtined for the Attack of the Enemy's Corps on the Summit of the Hill upon our Right. This Attack had been unavoidably poſtponed until the other Parts of the Diſpoſition could be made, and by that Means Tippoo ſhould be effectually awed and prevented from making any Attempt on the Flank or Rear of thoſe Troops whilſt they were moving forward to drive his Detachment from their Poſt. Our own Cavalry and the Nizam's Horſe were left out of the Reach of the Cannonade on the Deſcent of the riſing Ground on the oppoſite Side of the Ravine, in Readineſs to take Advantage of any Confuſion they might obſerve in the Enemy's Army; and Orders were given to Lieutenant-Colonel Maxwell, after ſucceeding in his Attack, to leave only a ſufficient Force to retain Poſſeſſion of the Summit of the Hill, and to advance immediately with the Remainder of his Corps, and endeavour to poſſeſs himſelf of the Mountains which covered the Left Flank of the Main Army of the Enemy.

A rocky Height afforded conſiderable Protection to the Troops from the Enfilade from the Hill on our Right, during the Time that was neceſſarily employed in making the Diſpoſition and forming the Lines; which being accompliſhed, I began the Action by ordering Lieutenant-Colonel Maxwell's Corps to attack the Hill on our Right, and, upon obſerving that he had, without much Loſs or Difficulty, completely ſucceeded, I moved forward with the Main Body of the Army, and the Action ſoon became general along the whole Front.

The Enemy's Cavalry, that had harraſſed us, and frequently attempted to break in upon the Infantry whilſt the Column was paſſing the Ravine, made no Stand after we were prepared to advance, Part of it retreating to the Weſtward of the Ridge on which the Carigut Pagoda ſtands, with the Infantry that had been driven from the Hill by Lieutenant-Colonel Maxwell, and the Remainder falling into the Rear of the Main Army.—Their Infantry, on this Occaſion, ſhewed a much better Countenance than uſual, which perhaps may be principally attributed to Tippoo's own Preſence and Exertions amongſt them; but, in a ſhort Time, they began to waver, and ſoon after, upon the Cavalry moving towards their Right, and Three Battalions of Lieutenant-Colonel Maxwell's Corps advancing rapidly to gain the Heights on their Left, they entirely gave Way.

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At this Moment our own Cavalry made a gallant Charge; but, after diſperſing and almoſt deſtroying a ſmall Body of Infantry that made a very determined Reſiſtance, were ſoon obliged to fall back, from a more conſiderable Body of Infantry, that had rallied and made a Stand on a Space of broken rocky Ground, extremely diſadvantageous for Cavalry; and at the Moment of their Retreat, and whilſt the whole of our firſt Line was impeded by it, the Nizam's Horſe, which had followed Colonel Floyd acroſs the Ravine, with very good Intentions, but very injudiciouſly, threw themſelves, in an unweildy Maſs, into the Front of our Left Wing, on a Piece of Ground ſo rugged and rocky, as well as ſo near to the Enemy's Batteries on the Iſland of Seringapatam, that they could not act with Efficacy in Front, and continued to prevent our Line of Infantry from advancing, by which Means an invaluable, though ſhort Space of Time was loſt, which enabled the Enemy to avail themſelves of the Vicinity of the Batteries upon the Iſland, and, by retreating to their Protection in the utmoſt Confuſion, to ſave their Army from entire Deſtruction.

Fatigued and exhauſted as the Troops were by the Badneſs of the Night, the Tedioufneſs of the March, and by their long and extraordinary Exertions during an exceſſive hot Day, and covered, as the beaten Enemy were, by the Works on the Iſland and by the Guns of the Fort, nothing more could then be attempted; and the Army accordingly, after the Arrival of the Tents from Arrakerry, encamped juſt beyond the Reach of the Cannon on the Iſland, and nearly on the Ground upon which the Action had terminated.

Three of the Enemy's Guns were taken on the Hill that was attacked by the Corps under the Command of Lieutenant-Colonel Maxwell; and One Gun, with a great Number of Standards and Colours, were taken from their Main Body. Their Loſs in Men was very conſiderable, but the Number could not be aſcertained.

It may probably appear to you, and to any other Perſons unacquainted with the peculiar Situation of Seringapatam, that, after having defeated the Enemy's Army, I might have proceeded to the Attack of the Place, without loſing Time, or putting myſelf to any material Inconvenience, to form a Junction with General Abercromby; but even if I had thought the heavy Guns that I had brought with me ſufficient for the Siege, I could not there, as at Bangalore, chuſe my Point of Attack, and keep my Army in a compact State to reſiſt the whole Force of the Enemy, and defend my Approaches. In order to beſiege the Fort it would have been neceſſary to force my Paſſage over to the Iſland; and this can only be done on the North Side, oppoſite to the Carigut Pagoda, where there is a good Ford, at the Diſtance of more than a Mile from the Fort; for the Ford on the South Side is not only very rugged and difficult, but is likewiſe commanded, within 700 Yards, by the Works of Seringapatam, and the Bridge, which is ſtill ſtanding on that Side, is immediately under the Guns of the Place.

The Ground on the South Side riſes gradually from the River; and, as Tippoo would certainly have croſſed over with his Army to that Side, as ſoon as he ſaw my Batteries in ſufficient Forwardneſs to enable me to force the Paſſage of the Northern Ford, I ſhould have been expoſed, on getting upon the Iſland, to a croſs Fire from the Fort and from the Enemy's Army, which would not only have rendered it impoſſible for me to attempt the Siege, but would probably have obliged me to abandon the Iſland with conſiderable Loſs.

It was therefore neceſſary, before any Attempt could be made upon the Iſland, that a Force, able to reſiſt the Attack of Tippoo's whole Army, ſhould be ſtationed on the South Side of the River, which could only be effected by my joining ſome of my Battalions to the Corps under General Abercromby; and I therefore determined, after allowing the Troops to recover themſelves a little from their Fatigues, by an Halt of Two Days on the Field of Battle, to proceed to the Kanambaddy Ford, according to my former Intention.

The Soil of all the Parts of the Myſore Country, that I have ſeen, is in general dry, and by Nature unfruitful, and Suſtenance, either for Men or Animals, can only be raiſed upon it by a moſt perſevering Induſtry in it's Inhabitants; but the Country adjoining to Seringapatam is peculiarly rugged and barren. The Mountains are immenſe bare Rocks, and the lower Grounds are ſo thin in Soil, and ſo univerſally and cloſely covered with large looſe Stones, that no conſiderable Produce can be raiſed from them by the Exertions of any Degree of Induſtry whatever.

The utmoſt Pains had likewiſe been taken by the Enemy, during the Two preceding Months, to deſtroy all the Villages, and every Particle of Forage and Proviſions belonging to the Inhabitants, within a Circuit of ſeveral Miles; and to thoſe Circumſtances, of ſo much Diſadvantage to the Operations of the Army, was to be added the premature Setting-in of the Monſoon, near a Month before the uſual Period; and, by the united Operation of the Cauſes that I have ſtated, we had not only, during the Six or Eight preceding Days, ſuffered very conſiderable Loſſes amongſt our Draft and Carriage Cattle, but the greateſt Part of thoſe which ſurvived, were at this Time reduced to a very weakly Condition.

We were obliged to make ſo great a Detour, that we could only reach the Kanambaddy Ford in Two Marches; and as the Face of the Country is exceedingly uneven and hilly, interſected with a Number of deep Ravines, and the Road for the heavy Guns was to be made the whole Way by our own Pioneers, theſe Marches were found ſo difficult, that, notwithſtanding the Preſſure for Time, I was forced to halt One Day, after the firſt March, by the Draft Cattle having been completely exhauſted in accompliſhing it.

Conſiderable Detachments of Troops were ordered to attend and aſſiſt the heavy Guns on the ſecond Day's March; but the Bullocks were ſo extremely reduced, that, even with the Aid of the Soldiers at the Drag-Ropes, their Progreſs was ſo tedious, that the Body of the Army was upwards of Twelve Hours in marching as many Miles, and the Rear Guard did not reach the Encampment near the Ford 'till Nine o'Clock in the Evening of the 20th of May.

It was not, however, till after I had received the Reports from the different Departments, on the following Morning, of the general wretched Condition of the public Cattle of the Army, that I ſaw the Impoſſibility of moving the heavy Guns and Stores from the Spot where they then were, and that it became neceſſary for me to decide on relinquiſhing entirely the Proſecution of the Plan for the Campaign, in which General Abercromby had been inſtructed to co-operate. I then loſt no Time in communicating my Determination to General Abercromby, who had advanced as far as Periapatam; and I directed him, after deſcending the Ghaut with the Troops under his Command, to put them into Cantonments on the Coaſt of Malabar, during the Rains, and until the proper Seaſon ſhould return for re-commencing our Operations.

The Effects of ſeveral Circumſtances, from which we had already ſuffered many Inconveniencies, preſſed upon us particularly hard at this Juncture; and none more than the Conduct of the Nizam's Cavalry, who were now, if poſſible, more inactive and more inattentive to my Requiſitions than ever.

Far from rendering the Services that I had expected from ſo numerous and powerful a Body of Horſe, in facilitating our Foraging, and in covering extenſive Tracts of Country, from which our Followers, as well as themſelves, might have obtained conſiderable Supplies of Proviſions, they had, regardleſs of my Remonſtrances, ſince the Commencement of our March from Bangalore, hardly ever ſent a Detachment beyond the Piquets of our Infantry, and had perſevered in exhauſting the ſmall Stock of Forage and Proviſions, which, in Spite of the Deveſtation made by the Enemy, was generally found within the Bounds of the Encampment, and which, if we had not been encumbered with them, we could have commanded for the Uſe of our own Army.

By this extraordinary Degree of obſtinate Supineneſs, that large Body of Men, with their Horſes and numerous Followers, about this Time, experienced the ſevereſt Diſtreſſes from Scarcity; and the vaſt Multitude of People belonging to our Army, for whom it is impoſſible for the Public to carry a Stock of Proviſions, were reduced to nearly the ſame Situation. Rice became ſo dear in the Buzars, that either the Preſſure of Hunger or the Temptation of the extravagant Prices, proved too powerful againſt all Precautions that could be taken, and occaſioned Depredations of the Grain that had been provided and brought with us, to ſupply the fighting Men of the Army, to ſo alarming an Extent, that the Apprehenſion that there would be a Want of Grain for the Soldiers, long before the Stores that had been provided for them ought to have been expended, operated powerfully, with other Reaſons, to force me to fall back to Bangalore.

Urgent, however, as our own Neceſſities were to move nearer to our Supplies, I could not leave Tippoo at Liberty to employ his whole Force againſt General Abercromby; and, therefore, reſolved to remain in my Poſition near the Ford, which held the main Body of the Enemy's Army in Check at Seringapatam, until I ſhould have Reaſon to believe that General Abercromby was out of all Danger of being interrupted in his Retreat by Tippoo's either marching in Perſon, or conſiderably reinforcing the Corps which I knew he had detached againſt him, but which alone was not of ſufficient Strength to make me apprehend that it could give General Abercromby any material Moleſtation.

In the mean Time I gave Directions to burſt Eleven heavy Guns, Eight Eighteen and Three Twenty-four Pounders, to bury or deſtroy the Military Stores that could not be carried with us, and to deliver nearly the whole of the Rice in our Poſſeſſion to the Troops, which, on a Calculation of eaſy Marches, would have been ſufficient to ſubſiſt them until they ſhould arrive at Bangalore; Meaſures which had now become the more indiſpenſibly neceſſary, as, in Addition to the Loſſes of public Cattle that we had ſuffered from the Cauſes that I have mentioned, an epidemical Diſorder, not uncommon in this Country, had broke out amongſt them, and had carried off ſeveral Thouſands in a few Days.

Having remained long enough to give ample Time to General Abercromby to fall back from Periapatam, I moved from my Encampment near the Ford on the Morning of the 26th, with the Intention to proceed to Bangalore, and to employ a few Months in refreſhing and reſting the Army, and to make every other neceſſary Preparation for reſuming our Operations againſt the Enemy's Capital, as ſoon as the Rivers ſhould ſubſide, unleſs Tippoo, in the mean Time, ſhould agree to make ſuch Conceſſions as the Confederates might reaſonably think they had a Right to exact from him.

Upon reaching the Ground that had been fixed upon for the firſt Day's Encampment, I was told, to my great Surprize, that ſome Mahratta Meſſengers had arrived to inform me that the Two Mahratta Armies, under the Command of Hurry Punt and Perſeram Bhow, were at no great Diſtance from us, and that their advanced Corps under Appa Saheb, Perſeram Bhow's Son, was almoſt in Sight.

I had for ſome Weeks before given up all Hopes of being joined by the Mahrattas, with whoſe dilatory Conduct I was much diſſatisfied; and although I ſaw that their Junction at this critical Time would be attended with many Advantages to the common Cauſe, I could not help lamenting, as not only our heavy Guns were now deſtroyed, but General Abercromby's Corps had actually deſcended the Ghauts, that by their Tardineſs in commencing their March, and from my having even been deprived of all Knowledge of their Approach by the Vigilance of the Enemy's Light Troops, and the Inactivity of the Nizam's Cavalry, an Opportunity was loſt which could not now be recalled, to drive the Enemy's whole Army, that had ſo recently been humbled by a Defeat, and would not have dared to keep the Field, into the Iſland of Seringapatam; where its Diſtreſſes muſt ſoon have reduced Tippoo to the Neceſſity of ſubmitting to the Terms of Peace that we might have preſcribed to him.

I took Meaſures, however, immediately for fixing as early a Day as poſſible for an Interview with the Chiefs, which, by a Movement of both Armies, took Place Three Days after; and as it was of great Conſequence to cultivate a good Underſtanding with them, I ſaid very little on the juſt Grounds which I had to complain of the Lateneſs of their Arrival, and contented myſelf, at the firſt Meeting, with obtaining a Knowledge of the Nature of their Inſtructions, and of their future Intentions.

They made the moſt explicit Declarations, that they were ordered by the Peſhwa, and that it was equally their own Inclination, to act entirely in Concert with me; and in the Courſe of Two or Three Conferences, it was not only ſettled that all the Confederate Forces ſhould keep the Field in the Myſore Country during the Rains, but they alſo acquieſced in a general Arrangement that I propoſed for the Diſpoſition of the Armies, the principal Objects of which were, to give me an eaſy and ſafe Communication with the Carnatic, to enable me to draw from thence the Supplies of Artillery and Stores that would be neceſſary for proſecuting the Operations of the enſuing Campaign, to ſubſiſt the Allied Armies, as much as might be poſſible, at the Expence of the Enemy, and to endeavour to deprive him of the Revenues and Reſources of all the Northern Parts of his Dominions.

Having ſtated to the Mahratta Chiefs the Danger of attempting to maintain the Communication with their own Country by the Route to the Weſtward of Chittledroog, by which Perſeram Bhow had marched from Durwar, they agreed to relinquiſh it, and to be ſatisfied with that by Sera and Roydroog, which I recommended as preferable, on Condition that I would delay my March to the Eaſtward until all the Detachments, which Perſeram Bhow had left upon his Route, could join the Army, or be ſent back acroſs the

the Zumbuddra; to which, upon their Aſſurances that we ſhould be able to purchaſe from the Grain Dealers attached to them, a ſufficient Quantity of Grain to ſubſiſt our Troops and Followers for ſome Time to come, I conſented.

In order, therefore, to effect theſe Purpoſes, we halted frequently, and having, ſoon after the Junction of the Mahrattas, ſent back to the Nizam all thoſe of his Troops that had, either from the Loſs or the Weakneſs of their Horſes, become unfit for Service, the Confederate Force moved together gradually, though ſlowly, towards Bangalore; and upon our Arrival within about Twenty Miles of that Place, it was thought adviſeable to acquieſce in Perſeram Bhow's Wiſhes to move with the Army under his own immediate Command towards Sera, to ſecure that Communication, and to poſſeſs himſelf of the adjoining Country, according to the Plan that had been arranged, Hurry Punt, with his Diviſion and the Nizam's Cavalry, remaining with our Army.

After drawing from Bangalore Four heavy Guns and a Supply of Proviſions, I marched from the Neighbourhood of that Place, on the 15th of July towards Ouſſore, a Fortreſs upon which Tippoo has beſtowed much Labour and Expence, but which, though in a very defenſible State, was not completely finiſhed. The Garriſon abandoned the Place on the Approach of a Detachment that I had ſent forward to inveſt and ſummon it; but they at the ſame Time ſprung a Mine under one of the Baſtions that did conſiderable Damage, and attempted, though unſucceſsfully, by a Train, to blow up the Powder Magazine.

Conformable to my Plan I placed the heavy Guns and the ſpare Stores and Proviſions in the Fort of Ouſſore, with a good Garriſon, and the Damage occaſioned by the Exploſion was ordered to be repaired with all poſſible Expedition: : A ſtrong Eſcort was at the ſame Time ſent to bring a large Convoy of various Kinds of Supplies from Amboor.

On the 18th of July the Army marched to ſupport a Brigade that I had detached to endeavour to reduce the Hill Forts adjoining to the Polycode Paſs (by far the eaſieſt and beſt in the whole Range of Mountains that divide the Myſore Country from the Carnatic) and in a few Days we were fortunate enough, by the ſpirited Behaviour of our Troops, and the Puſillanimity of the Garriſons, to obtain Poſſeſſion of a ſufficient Number of thoſe ſmall, but exceedingly ſtrong Places, to afford conſiderable Protection to the March of our Convoys, and to render it hazardous and difficult for the Enemy to ſend Troops into the Baramaul.

I conceive it to be needleſs to trouble you with a Detail of the Preparations that will be made in the Courſe of the next Two Months for inſuring Succeſs to the Plan of Operations for the enſuing Campaign, which will be nearly ſimilar to that which was intended for the laſt; and ſhall therefore content myſelf with aſſuring you, that no Exertions of mine ſhall be wanting to render them compleat; and that I have an entire Confidence in meeting with the moſt thorough Support from all your Governments.

It would be vain to ſuppoſe that we ſhould remain long undiſturbed by an Enemy ſo able and active as Tippoo: But although, from the immenſe Extent of our Poſſeſſions and Poſts, it may be impoſſible to prevent him from gaining ſome ſmall Advantages during the Period that we are reſtrained from carrying on offenſive Operations, I truſt it will not be in his Power to do any Thing which can either materially injure or impede the Execution of our main Objects.

He has lately, as I had long expected, made an Attempt to diſturb the Country of Coimbatore and our Southern Provinces, in which he has been completely foiled by the Gallantry and good Conduct of the Officers in that Quarter. But he has been ſucceſsful in routing a ſmall Detachment of Irregulars, which Perſeram Bhow had left at a great Diſtance from his Army, to blockade the Hill Fort of Madgheri, not far from Sera. I cannot ſay that I was much ſurprized at this Accident; and indeed, notwithſtanding my repeated Recommendations to them, to be cautious in detaching, and to avoid bad and diſtant Poſts, they are ſo apt to deviate from Syſtem in the Execution of any Plan, that I am afraid they muſt feel the ill Conſequences of improvident Conduct ſtill more ſeverely before I ſhall be able completely to command their Attention.

The Inconveniencies which the Expence of this War muſt occaſion to your Finances have given me the moſt ſincere Concern; but, on the other Hand, it is a Source of Satisfaction to myſelf, as it muſt be to every other Perſon who feels for the Intereſt and Honor of the Company and the Nation, that there is at preſent a favorable Proſpect that it will be terminated with valuable Acquiſitions to the Company, and to the other Members of the Confederacy; and with the Humiliation of a Prince, who forced us to draw the Sword by a wanton Violation of a ſolemn Treaty, and whoſe overgrown Power, directed by a perfidious and barbarous Diſpoſition, and by a Spirit of inſatiable Ambition, has frequently given juſt Cauſe of Alarm for the Safety of your Poſſeſſions in this Part of India, and has long rendered him an Object of the utmoſt Terror to all his other Neighbours.

Impelled, however, as I was, by the Conſideration of the State of your Finances, to put ſomething to the Hazard, in attempting to bring the War to a ſpeedy Concluſion, the Information that I had received of the Situation of political Affairs in Europe operated alſo ſtrongly to induce me to make an Effort to reduce the Enemy's Capital, and by that Means entirely break his Power, before the Setting-in of the periodical Rains; and although a Number of Circumſtances combined to counteract my Endeavour to ſhorten in that Manner the Duration of the War, yet whilſt the Failure has reflected no Diſgace upon the Britiſh Arms, the Attempt has in other Reſpects produced many ſolid Advantages to the common Cauſe, and without having been attended with any material Addition to the Expence, which we muſt neceſſarily have incurred if the Army had, during the ſame Period, remained in a State of Inactivity.

I have Reaſon to be perſuaded that all Inſtances on my Part would have been ineffectual, and that nothing but an Apprehenſion that their Intereſts might ſuffer by their not being preſent at the Reduction of Seringapatam, could have prevailed upon both the Mahratta Chiefs to leave in other Hands the Collection of the Revenues in the Enemy's fertile Northern Dominions that they had over-run, and to advance ſo rapidly to the Southward to form a Junction with me; and it is in conſequence of that Junction, and of their having conſented to remain with their numerous and powerful Cavalry to act in Concert with us, that we have been able, for ſo long a Period, to hem Tippoo with his Army into a very circumſcribed Space, and to deprive him of all Revenue or Supplies of any Kind from the greateſt Part of his extenſive Territories.

At the Time that we ſuffered the greateſt Inconvenience from the Inactivity of the Nizam's Cavalry, and I expreſſed my Diſſatisfaction, in the ſtrongeſt

Terms,